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Abstract This discussion provides several explanations for the evidence presented
in Balachandran and Mohanram (2010) that are consistent with efficient contracting.
I also show that—contrary to the suggestion of the title—CEOs do not benefit from
value destroying growth in earnings. Finally, I argue that there is no conclusive
evidence that corporate investments destroy value.
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1 Introduction
It is well established that top executive compensation depends not only on past stock
returns but also on accounting earnings, because accounting earnings can be more
informative about the executive’s actions than stock returns (Sloan 1993). The main
contribution of Balachandran and Mohanram (2010) is to show that different types
of earnings growth affect executive compensation differently. Balachandran and
Mohanram (2010) distinguish between earnings growth that is due to improved
profitability and growth that is generated by investments. While both types of
earnings growth lead to higher executive pay, growth from investments is rewarded
more than growth from improved profitability. This is an important finding that
warrants further analysis.
Balachandran and Mohanram (2010) also show that the two types of earnings
growth have different effects on contemporaneous and future stock returns. While
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growth from improved profitability is associated with positive returns, growth from
investment is associated with significantly negative returns. Hence, earnings growth
from investment appears to destroy shareholder value but is rewarded more than the
more valuable earnings growth from improved profitability. The title of the paper
even suggests that CEOs benefit from destroying shareholder value by way of
investments. Balachandran and Mohanram (2010) conclude that either compensa-
tion committees do not understand the difference between the two types of earnings
growth or that executive compensation practice is not efficient as it does not reflect
the interests of shareholders.
In this discussion, I point out that these conclusions are premature. In Sect. 2, I
argue that the empirical evidence does not support the view that corporate
investments destroy shareholder value. It is true that investments are associated with
negative current and future stock returns, but they are also associated with positive
announcement returns that typically occur in the year(s) before the actual
investment is made. In Sect. 3, I show in a back-of-the-envelope calculation that
CEOs do not benefit from value-destroying growth in earnings as the title of the
paper wrongly suggests. Balachandran and Mohanram (2010) only consider the
growth of annual CEO pay, but they do not take into account changes in the value of
the stock and option holdings of the CEO. If these holdings are correctly taken into
account, CEOs lose a substantial amount of wealth if they bring about ‘‘value-
destroying growth in earnings.’’
The core result of the paper—that earnings growth from investments is rewarded
more than growth from improved profitability—is not affected by this criticism. In
Sect. 4, I provide several arguments that can explain this finding in an efficient
contracting environment even if earnings growth from investments destroys
shareholder value. Therefore, there is no need to resort to the residual explanation
that directors ‘‘don’t get it’’ or that contracting is inefficient.
2 Do investments destroy shareholder value?
Titman et al. (2004) show that firms with abnormally high investments underper-
form their benchmarks for several years after the investments have been done. This
finding is mirrored in Balachandran and Mohanram’s (2010) result that earnings
growth from investments is associated with significantly negative future returns.
However, McConnell and Muscarella (1985) find substantial abnormal returns to the
announcement of major capital expenditure plans. For plans to increase the budget,
they find an abnormal return of ?1.0%, compared with -1.4% for plans to reduce
the budget. As major investment plans are announced several months or even years
in advance, Balachandran and Mohanram’s (2010) analysis of current and future
returns misses this effect. As a consequence, we cannot conclude from Balachan-
dran and Mohanram’s (2010) evidence that earnings growth from investments
destroys shareholder value. We can merely conclude—as Titman et al. (2004) do—
that investors seem to be too optimistic at the time of the announcement of an
investment plan, so that these firms underperform for a couple of years after the
announcement.
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Moreover, Balachandran and Mohanram (2010) implicitly suggest that CEOs can
choose freely between the two ways to improve earnings growth, but this might not
be the case in practice. If in the 1980s a producer of typewriters started to invest
heavily into computer technology, it was hardly the investment that led to lower
future returns, and improving profitability or doing nothing was not an option.
Therefore, the negative association between investments and future returns does not
necessarily imply that it is the investment that causes these lower returns.
3 Are CEO’s rewarded for value-destroying investments?
In this section, I quantify the effect of ‘‘value-destroying growth in earnings’’ on the
CEO’s personal wealth in a back-of-the-envelope calculation. The aim is to see
whether CEOs are really rewarded for investments that destroy shareholder value.
To keep the calculation simple, I abstract from the problems raised in the previous
section and assume that Table 3 in Balachandran and Mohanram (2010) captures
the complete effect on firm value of the CEO’s decisions.
According to Balachandran and Mohanram’s (2010) Table 2, the interquartile
range of growth from investment DICt-1WACCt is 1.00% - (-0.01%) = 1.01%.
Let us consider a CEO who increases earnings growth from investment by this
amount. Together with the results shown in Table 3, this would in expectation lead
to a contemporaneous stock return of -0.231.01% = -0.23% in the current year
and -0.851.01% = -0.86% in the following year. So the investment results in a
drop of shareholder wealth by 0.23% ? 0.86% = 1.09%. To see the effect on the
CEO’s compensation, we plug these numbers into the estimated equation from
Table 4. The growth in total CEO compensation associated with the 1.01% earnings
growth from investment is:
2:39  1:01%
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
reward for earnings growth from investment
þ 0:18  ð0:86%Þ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
punishment for drop in stock price
¼ 2:26%:
For the median CEO whose total compensation is $2.2 m (from Table 1), this
corresponds to an additional reward of $50,000. So the CEO seems to be rewarded
for value-destroying growth in earnings as the title of Balachandran and
Mohanram’s (2010) paper suggests.
However, this analysis does not take into account the CEO’s holdings of stock
and stock options that have been awarded to her in previous years. Hall and
Liebman (1998) show that most of the pay to performance sensitivity in executive
compensation is attributable to changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock and
stock options, and very little is due to changes in current compensation. According
to Dittmann and Maug (2007) in the year 2000, a typical CEO owned stock and
options with a market value of $6.6 million and $6.1 million, respectively, and the
median option delta (the sensitivity of the option value to a change in the stock
price) is 0.86. Therefore, the effect of a stock price drop of 1.09% on the CEOs
portfolio is -1.09%($6.6 million ? $6.1 million0.86) = -$129,000. If we add
this loss to the gain in current compensation of $50,000, the total effect of the
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value-destroying investment strategy on the CEO’s wealth is $50,000–
$129,000 = -$79,000. Consequently, the CEO is not rewarded but rather—and
quite appropriately—punished for value-destroying investments.
While this rough calculation shows that CEOs are not rewarded for value-
destruction, it is still true that CEOs are punished less for the destruction of
shareholder value through investments than for other forms of shareholder value
destruction. In the next section, I discuss a couple of reasons why this might be the
case.
4 Why are CEOs rewarded for investments?
It is puzzling that earnings growth from investments is rewarded more than earnings
growth from increased profitability, even though the authors present some evidence
that shareholders profit more from the latter type of growth. This section proposes
four explanations for this finding that are consistent with the notion of efficient
contracting. The first three arguments are based on the idea that investments can
change the firm (and its requirements) substantially and that these changes are
reflected in CEO pay. The fourth argument focusses on the incentives for CEOs to
do investments.
4.1 Bigger firms need more talent and effort
It is well established that CEO pay increases with firm size. Gabaix and Landier
(2008) argue that scarce talent is more valuable in bigger firms, so that the most
talented CEOs end up in the biggest firms with the highest pay package. In their
model, a firm that has grown faster than other firms would sack its CEO and hire a
somewhat more talented CEO at a higher cost. In reality, however, there are
considerable switching costs and substantial uncertainty about CEO talent that
prevent firms from replacing their CEOs too often.
So why do firms pay their old CEO more after (potentially value-destructing)
earnings growth through investments? Following Gabaix and Landier (2008), it is
efficient to run the new, bigger firm with a more talented CEO than the old, smaller
firm. Ex ante, however, it might not be clear whether the old CEO has—or can
develop—the required skills to run the bigger firm. Therefore, the firm could pay the
old CEO more under the assumption that she has the required skills. If it turns out
after awhile that she has not, she is replaced with a more talented CEO. If the old
CEO can deliver, higher pay is necessary in order to keep her. On the other hand, if
she is not up to the task, she is dismissed and higher pay can be understood as a
compensation for the increased probability of being dismissed.
A related argument is that running a bigger firm and overseeing major
investments requires additional effort that must be compensated. To sum up, higher
pay could be justified by the higher talent or effort that is needed to run the enlarged
firm.
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4.2 CEO turnover and CEO pay
Dittmann et al. (2010) show that the optimal contract for a loss-averse CEO with an
exogenous reference wage features two regions: below a certain stock price, the
CEO is dismissed and receives a very low payout. For higher stock prices, she
receives a wage above her reference wage, and in this region her wage increases
with the stock price. Hence, a CEO with a higher reference wage receives higher on-
the-job pay. On the other hand however, a higher reference wage is associated with
a higher dismissal probability. A CEO who ‘‘demands more’’ gets more on-the-job
but will also be dismissed faster.
We know little about the process how reference wages are formed. A plausible
hypothesis is that CEOs compare themselves with their peers in other companies of
comparable size. If a CEO undertook an investment program that increased the
firm’s size, the composition of this peer group changes and the CEO compares
herself with the CEOs in bigger firms than before. As bigger firms in general pay
higher wages to their CEOs, the CEO’s reference wage increases. According to
Dittmann et al. (2010), this would then lead to an increase in the CEO’s pay and, at
the same time, to an increase in her dismissal probability. There is anecdotal
evidence that big investments, and in particular mergers and acquisitions, make the
dismissal of the initiating CEO more likely. The higher pay can then be interpreted
as a compensation for this higher dismissal probability.
This argument shows that it is not enough to look only at changes in
compensation, as Balachandran and Mohanram (2010) do. We also must take into
account the likelihood of dismissals before we can conclude that CEOs benefit from
a given action.
4.3 Investments, risk, and risk-premium
Major investments are often associated with additional uncertainty, so that
investments are likely to increase the firm’s stock price volatility. In contrast,
changes in the firm’s profitability are unlikely to be related to firm risk. As CEOs are
required to invest a large part of their wealth in their own firm, they must be
compensated for the cost of not being diversified. This risk-premium increases with
the firm’s volatility and should consequently be larger for firms that have just done
substantial investments.
4.4 Incentives to invest in risky projects
CEOs will be hesitant to take any action that increases their firms’ risk. A big part of
their wealth is tied to firm value, so any increase in firm risk would also make their
personal investments riskier. If investments increase firm risk, CEOs need
additional incentives to take investments that are worthwhile for shareholders
(see Guay 1999 and Dittmann and Yu 2010). Promising CEOs a pay rise if
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